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Abstract
Populism, particularly in its radical right-wing variants, is often posited as antithetical to the principles of liberalism. Yet
a number of contemporary cases of populist radical right parties from Northern Europe complicate this characterisation
of populism: rather than being directly opposed to liberalism, these parties selectively reconfigure traditionally liberal de-
fences of discriminated-against groups—such as homosexuals or women—in their own image, positing these groups as
part of ‘the people’ who must be protected, and presenting themselves as defenders of liberty, free speech and ‘Enlight-
enment values’. This article examines this situation, and argues that that while populist radical right parties in Northern
Europe may only invoke such liberal values to opportunistically attack their enemies—in many of these cases, Muslims
and ‘the elite’ who allegedly are abetting the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe’—this discursive shift represents a move towards a
‘liberal illiberalism’. Drawing on party manifestoes and press materials, it outlines the ways in which these actors articulate
liberal illiberalism, the reasons they do so, and the ramifications of this shift.
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1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that populism is an illiberal phe-
nomenon. While there is ongoing debate about pop-
ulism’s democratic credentials (see Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2012; Panizza, 2005), most scholars would not
object to characterising populism as antithetical to liber-
alism, whether it is right-wing, left-wing or another ideo-
logical variant of populism. Here, populism’s propensity
for constructing ‘the people’ as a homogenous group,
construing ‘the elite’ as a singular actor, for ignoring or
suppressing difference, and in the case of right-wing pop-
ulists, for actively targeting minority groups, are seen as
flying in the face of liberalism’s commitment to pluralism,
openness, and the protection of individual liberty.
However, recent high-profile cases of populist radi-
cal right (PRR) parties from Northern Europe complicate
this characterisation: rather than being directly opposed
to liberalism, these parties reconfigure traditional liberal
defences of discriminated-against groups in their own
populist image, characterising groups such as homosex-
uals and women as part of ‘the people’ who require pro-
tection from ‘the elite’ and associated dangerous Others.
They also invoke liberal defences of free speech, secu-
larism and individual freedom, and thus ‘display a more
‘civic’ and liberal democratic face’ (Pels, 2011, p. 27)
than older PRR parties. Against an elite that is allegedly
in thrall to cultural relativism and political correctness,
these populists present themselves as the true defend-
ers of liberty and ‘Enlightenment values’.
This article examines this situation by compara-
tively analysing five contemporary cases of PRR par-
ties in Northern Europe that have often utilised liberal
arguments—the Party for Freedom (PVV) and Lijst Pim
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Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats
(SD) in Sweden, the Danish People’s Party (DF) in Den-
mark and the Progress Party (FrP in Norway)—and ex-
ploring what they reveal about the complicated relation-
ship between populism and liberalism. It argues that
these cases can be viewed as examples of ‘liberal illib-
eralism’, in which illiberal attacks on particular Others as-
sociated with ‘the elite’—in many of these cases, Mus-
lims and Islamists who are allegedly bringing about the
‘Islamisation’ of Europe—are couched in a liberal dis-
course.1 To do this, it first examines the extant literature
on populism’s relationship with liberalism, before turn-
ing to the question of how these parties invoke liberal-
ism in their policy platforms and public statements. Here,
it examines four themes core to the strand of ‘romantic
liberalism’ (Gustavsson, 2015) these parties draw upon:
the defence of gender and sexual minorities; individual
freedom; secularism; and free speech. It finds that these
parties selectively invoke liberalism, utilising it less as an
ideological compass than a discourse that is easily com-
bined with a nativist ideology and populist style. It then
examines the reasons why these PRR parties utilise lib-
eral illiberalism, as well as the repercussions of doing this
for the wider political landscape. With these findings in
mind, it then closes by considering whether the strict bi-
nary between liberalism and populism needs reconsider-
ing, given their intermingling is far more complicated in
practice than in theory.
It should be noted that this article is directed to-
wards and engages primarily with the literature on pop-
ulism (and PRR parties) in Western Europe. While other
relevant and adjacent literatures have explored simi-
lar themes, such as the tensions and challenges inher-
ent in combining liberal values with diverse models of
citizenship—see for example the literatures on civic inte-
gration (Joppke, 2005; Joppke & Morawska, 2003), con-
tested citizenship (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy,
2005) or multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995)—
these debates are beyond the limits of the article. PRR
parties are here understood via the influential definition
provided by Mudde (2007), whereby this party family
combines nativism, authoritarianism and populism (al-
though as shall be argued, the populist component of
the PRR party family is less a matter of ideology than a
discourse or political style).
2. Populism versus Liberalism
Before progressing, it is worth defining the key terms
being utilised in this article: populism and liberalism.
Both are contested concepts—some would say they go
so far as to fall into the category of being essentially
contested concepts (Abbey, 2005; Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2017)—but the limited focus of this article pre-
vents us diving too deeply into these conceptual argu-
ments. For our purposes, populism is here understood
as ‘a political style that features an appeal to ‘the people’
versus ‘the elite’, ‘bad manners’ and the performance of
crisis, breakdown or threat’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 45). This is
somewhat different to Mudde’s (2007) influential defini-
tion of populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’, reflecting
the fact that populism is difficult to conceptualize and
measure as a core ideological feature of a party family
(see Aslanidis, 2016) and the approach has been refuted
by the creator of the notion of ‘thin-centered ideology’
(Freeden, 2017). However, my chosen definition is co-
herent with Mudde’s definition of PRR parties, acknowl-
edging that populist style is a key feature of these par-
ties’ public expressions and discourse. Liberalism, mean-
while, here is understood in its ideological sense, as op-
posed to historical or philosophical senses, as laid out
by Freeden (2005, p. 5), in which it is seen as ‘an ideol-
ogy that contains seven political concepts that interact at
its core: liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, socia-
bility, the general interest, and limited and accountable
power’ (Freeden, 2015, p. 15). In the contemporary Euro-
pean context, these ideological components tend to be
reconfigured along a number of different subtypes of lib-
eralism, which Gustavsson (2015) labels as reformation
liberalism, enlightenment liberalism and romantic liber-
alism. These subtypes follow Locke, Kant or Mill in plac-
ing diversity, autonomy and self-expression as their pri-
mary values respectively.
What happens when we draw populism and liberal-
ism together? As noted, populism is generally seen as an-
tithetical to liberalism in the academic literature. The vo-
ciferousness of authors who make this argument varies:
on one side, we have those who see populism as not
only illiberal, but also as undemocratic; on the other, we
have authors who see populism as illiberal, but accept
its democratic credentials. In the former camp, authors
such as Müller (2014, p. 484) argue that populism ‘is
a profoundly illiberal and, in the end, directly undemo-
cratic understanding of representative democracy’. In
the latter camp, authors generally contend that populism
is ‘one form of what Fareed Zakaria has recently popu-
larized as ‘illiberal democracy’’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 561).
Switching the order of the syntagm, Krastev has argued
that populism ‘capture[s] the major political trend in our
world today: the rise of democratic illiberalism’ (Krastev,
2007a, p. 104), and notes that ‘populism is antiliberal but
it is not antidemocratic’ (Krastev, 2007b, p. 60).
Perhaps themost extensive exploration of populism’s
relationship to liberalism comes from Pappas (2014,
2016), who uses the same language as Krastev to provide
and defend a minimal definition of populism as ‘demo-
cratic illiberalism’, arguing that this definition is useful as
it ‘points directly to populism’s ‘negative pole’, namely,
political liberalism…populism, in short, may be demo-
cratic, but it is not liberal’ (Pappas, 2014, p. 3). Drawing
on Riker (1982) and Rawls (2005), Pappas argues that lib-
eralism and populism differ along three key lines: liberal-
1 I am not the first to note this situation—others have explored this contrast, but have focused on these parties’ nationalism rather than their populism
(Brubaker, 2017; De Koster, Achterberg, Van der Waal, Van Bohemen, & Kemmers, 2014; Halikiopoulou, Mock, & Vasilopoulou, 2013).
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ism’s multiple cleavages versus populism’s single cleav-
age between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’; liberalism’s
‘overlapping consensus’ that seeks moderation versus
populism’s adversarial politics; and liberalism’s constitu-
tionalism versus populism’s majoritarianism.2 More so,
Pappas (2016) argues that his definition of populism as
‘democratic illiberalism’ not only allows us to distinguish
it from political liberalism, but also autarchy, or as he re-
words it to explicitly demonstrate its difference from his
own concept, ‘nondemocratic illiberalism’. This clarifica-
tion is useful as it demonstrates where those who see
populism as both illiberal and non-democratic have gone
wrong—they conflate it with autarchy.
Yet as useful as Pappas’ populism/liberalism/autarchy
typology is, there are cases that fall ‘in between the
cracks’, rather than fitting neatly into one category. In
this regard, empirical reality is never as clear-cut as the-
ory, something that Pappas readily admits:
Some cases, to be sure, will be mixed bags, and there-
fore their inclusion in analysis, or exclusion from it,
will be assumed by how one defines ‘democracy’ or
‘illiberalism’. Should we, for instance, classify Hun-
gary’s Jobbik as a populist (i.e., illiberal but still demo-
cratic) party, or is it to be relegated to the category
of nondemocratic parties, which fall outside our re-
search concerns? Another example: Is the strong anti-
immigration discourse of the Danish Progress Party a
clear enough indication of ‘illiberalism’ (so that we
can classify this party as populist), or is it reckoned
simply as a set of ultra-conservative ideas, and pol-
icy proposals, of an otherwise perfectly liberal party?
(Pappas, 2016)
It is this set of ‘mixed bag’ cases that are of interest to this
article, which concerns itself not with the former cases
(where the border between democratic/nondemocratic
is in question), but rather with the latter cases, in which
the liberal/illiberal distinction is unclear.
There are precedents for trying to classify these
‘mixed bag’ cases. The terms ‘centrist populism’ (Učeň,
2004) and ‘new/centrist populism’ (Pop-Eleches, 2010)
have been used to classify parties in Eastern Europe
that combine populism with otherwise relatively liberal-
centrist positions, while Wolkenstein (2016, pp. 14–15)
has convincingly argued that the populism of the Scot-
tish National Party should be understood as a ‘liberal
populism’. The same term has also been used by Fella
and Ruzza (2013, p. 42) in the context of Italy: ‘while the
populism of the LN could be described as of radical right
or nativist in character, that of Berlusconi might be de-
scribed as closer to ‘liberal populism’’.
3. Illiberal Liberalism in Northern Europe
Yet one cannot use the same terminology—centrist or
liberal populism—to describe the Northern European
PRR parties explored here—the PVV, LPF, SD, DF and
FrP. These parties have been chosen as they are the
most prominent cases of PRR parties in Northern Eu-
rope (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Mudde, 2007, 2013) and
this study follows a similar regional-based approach put
forward by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015).3 Each
of these parties combine policies that are undeniably
xenophobic and putatively anti-liberal with at times clas-
sically liberal positions in other policy areas. The for-
mer policies are well-documented in the academic liter-
ature, and thus do not require a lengthy analysis here:
in addition to the anti-liberal positions lay out by Pap-
pas above, they include racism (Widfeldt, 2015), nativism
(Hellström & Hervik, 2014), xenophobia (Rydgren, 2010)
and authoritarianism (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). What is
of interest, however, are the latter policies, which have
been less explored. The liberal themes that these par-
ties tend to use to couch their otherwise relatively con-
sistent illiberalism coalesce around: 1) gender and sex-
uality; 2) individual freedom; 3) ‘Christian secularism’
(Brubaker, 2017); and 4) free speech. Given that liber-
alism is such a broad church, these specific areas have
been selected to examine as they broadly reflect the con-
cerns of the variant of ‘romantic liberalism’ put forward
by Gustavsson (2014, 2015)—a mode of ‘hard’ liberal-
ism that sees self-expression as the primary value that
justifies liberal rights rather than diversity, tolerance or
autonomy—that is relatively common in the discursive
and ideological platforms of many actors on the con-
temporary Western European (populist as well as non-
populist) right. More so, these themes firmly fit into the
sociocultural dimension of liberalism (rather than the so-
cioeconomic dimension),which is focused onhere due to
the increasing salience of sociocultural issues for PRR par-
ties inWestern Europe (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn,
2016a). In the following section, I draw on these par-
ties’ platforms and public statements to examine each
of these themes in turn. Taken together, I argue that
these parties articulate a ‘liberal illiberalism’, whereby
selective elements of liberal discourse and ideology are
utilised to defend an ultimately illiberal position.
The first liberal theme invoked byNorthern European
PRR parties revolves around the protection of sexual mi-
2 In a later article, Pappas modifies liberalism’s two latter features to read ‘the pursuit of political moderation, and the protection of minority rights’
(Pappas, 2016).
3 There is some debate about whether the FrP is a populist radical right party: Jungar & Jupskås (2014, p. 216) argue it is ‘less authoritarian and more
economically right-wing’ than other PRR parties, and thus ‘is probably best seen as a hybrid between a PRR party and a more traditional conservative
party’ although Jupskås (2016, p. 169) has elsewhere referred to the party as a ‘radical right-wing populist party’. Here I choose to include FrP in this
article, following the example set by Rydgren (2008, p. 738), who argues that despite the party’s toned-down ethno-nationalism/nativism, it operates
as something of a ‘functional equivalent’ to PRR parties, as ‘earlier research indicates that they are electorally successful for approximately the same
reasons and satisfy approximately the same political demand’, while other influential authors often include them in their studies of similarly-named
party families or groupings (e.g. Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010; Norris, 2005).
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norities and gender equality. The former has been par-
ticularly pertinent in the Netherlands, where the LPF’s
leader, Pim Fortuyn, was keen to promote his social liber-
alness with pronouncements about his homosexuality—
as he once claimed to a critic who accused him of racism:
‘I have nothing against Moroccans. I’ve been to bed with
so many of them!’ (in Pels, 2003, p. 42). PVV leader
Geert Wilders has also been keen to paint himself as an
ally of the LGBTQ community, arguing that he is fighting
for ‘the freedom that gay people should have—to kiss
each other, tomarry, to have children—[which] is exactly
what Islam is fighting against’ (in Lester Feder, 2016),
and speaking at the ‘Wake Up’ LGBT Republican National
Convention event in 2016, alongside Milo Yiannopolous.
The Scandinavian PRR have been less enthusiastic about
LGTBQ rights: the DF are opposed to same-sex mar-
riage; the SD does not oppose it, but also does not re-
ally support it with any vigour in its manifesto or pub-
lic pronouncements; while the FrP only shifted its sup-
port behind same-sex marriage (and adoption by same-
sex couples) in 2013. Nonetheless, these parties do ar-
gue against discrimination against LGBTQ people in their
policy platforms, with the SD supporting legal prosecu-
tion against those who discriminate against people due
to sexual orientation, and the DF explicitly targeting Is-
lam as an enemy of the LGBTQ community, claiming that
‘in recent decades, homosexuals have come under pres-
sure from intolerant Islamic groups’ and arguing that the
party will ‘work determinedly against oppression and dis-
crimination against homosexuals’, encouraging the po-
lice to ‘take targeted action against specific groups that
may exhibit despicable intolerance against homosexuals’
(Dansk Folkeparti, 2009).
These parties have also positioned themselves as de-
fenders of gender equality, although this tends to be a
matter of discourse rather than policy. The Scandinavian
PRR parties tend to treat gender equality as an estab-
lished ‘fact’ in their countries, rather than a goal that still
needs dedicated work to be achieved. This framing of
gender equality allows these parties to appear to support
gender equality and simultaneously criticise measures
aimed at achieving further gender equality. In the first
regard, ‘conceiving equality as a matter of national pride,
something already or nearly achieved, enables belittling
gender discrimination and concealing power structures
that cause gender inequality because they cannot pos-
sibly exist in a country that ‘has gender equality’’ (Ylä-
Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2017, p. 44). This argument is par-
ticularly helped in the cases of the DF and FrP, where
the PRR parties have been or are led by women, Pia
Kjærsgaard and Siv Jensen. In the latter regard, it follows
that if gender equality has ‘been achieved’, then any fur-
ther work towards gender equality is akin to social engi-
neering by ‘the elite’ or ‘forcing’ men and women to be
the same, which is a form of discrimination in several of
these parties’ eyes. This manoeuvre is evident in the po-
sition of the DF, which states that it is ‘committed to full
and unreserved gender equality’, but notes that ‘equal-
ity should not be confused with positive discrimination’
(Dansk Folkeparti, 2009), as well as the position of the SD,
who see gender policies as highlighting difference rather
than equality (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). This ‘equal-
ity but not positive discrimination’ argument works for
both the more socially conservative populist right par-
ties (SD and DF) as well as the more neoliberal populist
right parties (FrP, PVV and LPF), in that the former can
oppose it on grounds of ‘natural’ differences between
the genders in line with their conservative preference for
so-called ‘traditional families’, and the latter can present
equality policies as interfering with individual and mar-
ket choice.
Where these parties truly invoke a strong defence of
gender equality is when it comes to the perceived sexism
andmisogyny of immigrants, who are seen as not sharing
the liberal gender attitudes of native Northern European
citizens. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015, p. 29)
argue, in the context of PRR parties, ‘gender issues have
become almost exclusively tied to the overarching issue
of immigration or, better, integration’. For the Northern
European PRR, this takes three tracks. The first is the
need to defend the aforementioned hard-won achieve-
ment of gender equality from the threat of the influx
of immigrants, whose presence will somehow dilute or
threaten the liberal status quo: asWilders puts it, the pro-
cess of Islamisation in the Netherlands ‘flushes decades
of women emancipation through the toilet’ (in Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 29). The second is the need to
protect native-born women from the misogynistic prac-
tices of immigrants: the SD, for example, released a re-
port in 2010 entitled ‘Time to Speak Out About Rape!’, in
which they claimed that Sweden was undergoing a ‘rape
wave’ due to the high levels of immigrants allowed into
the country, and therefore the key way to reduce sexual
assault was to limit immigration (Sverigedemokraterna,
2010). The third is to ban misogynistic cultural practices
from immigrant communities, thus ‘freeing’ immigrant
women from their ‘cultural prisons’: here we can think
of the FrP proposing a ban on the ‘burkini’ and the head-
scarf in schools on the basis that Norwegians should not
‘tolerate that girls of such a young age are systematically
indoctrinated to accept that women are subordinate and
can be suppressed as adults’ (in Akkerman & Hagelund,
2007, p. 209). In all these cases, the allegedly cultural-
relativistic ‘elite’ are seen as abetting the destruction of
gender equality in allowing increasing immigration lev-
els from ‘unliberal’ cultures. As Akkerman notes, these
parties ultimately have a ‘Janus-faced’ approach to gen-
der issues:
principles like gender equality and freedom of choice
are emphasized in the immigration and integration
domain, while almost all the parties are conserva-
tive when they address issues related to the fam-
ily…[this] suggests that their commitment to liberal-
ism is merely instrumental to an anti-Islam agenda.
(Akkerman, 2015, p. 56)
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 112–122 115
In short, it seems that these parties are attempting to
‘have their cake and it eat it too’ when it comes to gen-
der, with liberal notions of freedom of expression and
tolerance being invoked only when convenient.
The second liberal theme utilised by the Northern Eu-
ropean PRR revolves around individual freedom and lib-
erty. The Dutch PRR’s liberalness in this regard has been
particularly pronounced, with the LPF having promoted
policies such as allowing euthanasia and supporting the
legalisation of drugs and prostitution, and the PVV also
having ‘relatively libertarian views on a number of eth-
ical issues’, including ‘the right to abortion, embryo se-
lection and euthanasia’ (Vossen, 2016, p. 55).4 Cultural
attitudes towards drugs and prostitution are stricter in
Scandinavia than the Netherlands, and this is reflected
in the fact that the Scandinavian PRR parties tend to
have a more conservative approach to these issues. In-
deed, the SD and DF have adopted a hard-line stance
on drug policy, whereas there has been some debate
in the FrP about drug legalisation, and there is support
in the party for a more medicalised approach to drug
treatment rather than criminalisation (Fremskrittspar-
tiet, 2016). The same goes for euthanasia—while the FrP
is in favour of legalised euthanasia (Fremskrittspartiet,
2015a), the DF opposes it but supports more ‘end of
life’ solutions (Dansk Folkeparti, n.d.), while the SD has
tended to avoid the issue. When it comes to prostitution,
the SD and DP subscribe to the ‘Nordic model’ of crimi-
nalising the buying of sex, rather than the selling of it by
prostitutes, whereas the FrP is against the model, argu-
ing that it has made things more dangerous for sex work-
ers (Tjernshaugen, 2017).
The third liberal theme invoked by the Northern Eu-
ropean PRR is secularism, which at first glance may look
peculiar, particularly in the Scandinavian context given
the very high percentages of national church member-
ship. However, as Brubaker points out, this is a selec-
tive secularism:
today, secularist rhetoric in Northern andWestern Eu-
rope is directed against Muslim immigrants and their
descendants, whose religiosity is seen as threaten-
ing despite the fact that Islam has little institutional
power, political influence, or cultural authority in the
wider society. (2017, p. 1201)
Whilst membership in the national Christian churches is
seen as benign and borderline as a cultural membership
rather than a strict religious affiliation (van den Breemer,
Casanova, & Wyller, 2014), being a Muslim is seen as
a dangerous all-encompassing identity at odds with the
otherwise ‘secular’ society. These parties are thus advo-
cates of what Brubaker (2016) has called ‘Christian secu-
larism’, whereby Christianity—if not the church, then the
broader Christian tradition—‘is redefined as the matrix
of liberalism, secularity, gender equality, and gay rights’.
PRR parties’ conjoined defence of both secularism and
‘Judeo–Christian culture’ in this regard allows them to
specifically target Islam as their enemy. For example, the
DF argues that the ‘State and Church should not be sep-
arated. The Danish national church is part of Danish his-
tory and culture’ (in Restrup & Bech-Jessen, 2015), and
defends the ‘Judeo–Christian culture [that has] managed
to create the freedom and tolerance that is the founda-
tion for democracy’ against ‘fundamentalist religions—
especially Islam’ (Dansk Folkeparti, 2009). A similar po-
sition is put forth by the SD, who claim to promote reli-
gious freedom, but defend the Swedish Church and ex-
plicitly attack Islam as ‘difficult to harmoniously coex-
ist with Swedish and Western culture’ (Sverigedemokra-
terna, 2011, p. 27). While the FrP was very critical of the
Norwegian Church in the 1970s and 1980s, it has since
changed its tune to one similar to the DF and SD, arguing
that ‘Christian culture and ethics [are the] fundamental
values of the Norwegian society’ (Harry, 2014, p. 165).
Although church membership is far lower in the Nether-
lands, the PVV nonetheless takes a similar tack, defend-
ing Judeo–Christian values against the ‘totalitarianism’ of
Islam, which is seen not a religion but allegedly a ‘totali-
tarian ideology’—and even Pim Fortuyn, whose sexuality
would seemingly put him at odds with the conservative
sexual mores of the Christian Church, defended ‘Judeo–
Christian humanism’ against Islam (Kluveld, 2016).
The fourth liberal theme invoked by Northern Euro-
pean PRR parties is freedom of speech and expression.
While ‘the elite’ and those on the left are portrayed as
being in favour of political correctness and as wanting to
police speech, those on the PRR portray themselves as
the final defenders of free speech and artistic expression
in a world gone mad. In some cases, the PRR has indeed
experienced the reality of restrictions on free speech,
with several of the parties having hate speech charges
filed against them, but only the PVV being successfully
found guilty of such charges. In 2016, Wilders was found
guilty of inciting racial discrimination for calling for ‘fewer
Moroccans’ in the Netherlands, and he portrayed this
court battle as ‘the trial against the freedom of speech’,
framing it in populist terms by stating it was ‘against
a politician who says what the politically correct elite
does notwant to hear’ (Wilders, 2016). Such hate speech
laws, according to Wilders, made the Netherlands ‘a dic-
tatorship’, and like his forbearer, Fortuyn, he called for
the laws to be abolished (van Noorloos, 2014, p. 252).
The Scandinavian PRR parties have also portrayed them-
selves as victims of overzealous speech-policing and as
defenders of free speech. The FrP claims that freedom
of speech is ‘amongst the most fundamental freedoms’
(Fremskrittspartiet, n.d.) that human beings have, and
Siv Jensen has argued that ‘freedom of expression is
absolute’ (in Fremskrittspartiet, 2015b). The DF, mean-
while, has argued that ‘freedom of expression should
be as broad as possible’ (in Restrup, 2015). Indeed, the
path of free speech in the Netherlands is held up as a
warning by some Scandinavian populists: following the
4 The PVV’s position on drugs has oscillated between being against legalisation and avoiding the issue altogether (Vossen, 2016, p. 49).
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Muhammed cartoon controversy of 2005, then-leader of
the DF, Pia Kjærsgaard, brought up the murder of Theo
van Gogh and the dangers faced by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and
Geert Wilders as examples what happens when a coun-
try ‘compromises on freedom’ (Kjærsgaard, 2005). Per-
haps unsurprisingly, despite their claims of being defend-
ers of free speech, their passion for free speech depends
on who is doing the speaking—Geert Wilders has repeat-
edly called for the Koran to be banned, while the DF re-
cently clarified that they are ‘not freedom fundamental-
ists’ (in Ritzau, 2015) and wish to sanction the praising or
condoning of terrorism.
Drawing the brief examination of these parties’ os-
tensibly liberal sociocultural policies together, it be-
comes clear that their usage of liberalism is far from
consistent. Rather than unequivocally defending liberal
values, these parties tend to selectively pick-and-choose
the most appropriate and useful parts of liberalism and
refashion them for their own illiberal means. This is par-
ticularly clear when it comes to their defence of gender
equality and LGBTQ rights, which only seems to serve to
demonise Islam, and their defence of free speech, which
is targeted towards ‘the elite’. Apart from the case of the
LPF (and to a lesser extent, the PVV), the lukewarm ap-
proach to individual freedoms and the convenient usage
of ‘Christian secularism’ indicate that these parties’ com-
mitment to several core components of liberalism identi-
fied by Freeden (2015)—particularly those of liberty, ra-
tionality and progress—is weak. As such, it is worth ask-
ing where indeed they fit in the wider ideological span
of liberalism—if at all. Halikiopoulou et al. (2013, p. 112)
argue that these parties’ liberalism is not of a Millean va-
riety, but rather should be located within the lineage of
Lockean liberalism, in that their tolerance only runs so far
as to accommodate those who also tolerate others. Tri-
adafilopoulos (2011, p. 863) goes one step further and
calls their brand of liberalism ‘Schmittian liberalism’, in
that they aim ‘to clarify the core values of liberal societies
and use coercive state power to protect them from illib-
eral and putatively dangerous groups’. Yet these actors’
selective use of liberalism to serve illiberal ends should
not force us to call them liberals—the term ‘liberal illib-
eralism’ is more useful in this regard in that illiberalism
remains the subject of the paradoxical phrase, demon-
strating that exclusion is ultimately the primary logic at
play in these PRR parties’ ideology and discourse (Mudde
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).
4. The Purpose and Repercussions of Liberal
Illiberalism
Having examined the selective use of liberalism by North-
ern European PRR parties—what I have labelled here
as ‘liberal illiberalism’—we can now turn to the impor-
tant questions of why they choose to articulate a ver-
sion of illiberal liberalism, and the potential repercus-
sions of doing so. First: why utilise liberal illiberalism?
One reason is the fact that cultural, linguistic and ideolog-
ical contexts that these parties are operating within are
not vacuums—the countries of Northern Europe are cel-
ebrated for their pluralism, liberal social values and pro-
gressiveness (see, for example, Ervasti, Fridberg, Hjerm,
& Ringdal, 2008; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Weldon,
2006), and thus it is unsurprising that these parties will
pull from the resources that are familiar and available
to them in this context. As Halikiopoulou et al. argue,
these parties are operating within a ‘civic zeitgeist’ char-
acterised by a ‘current towards tolerance, diversity and
rights’ (2013, p. 109), and ‘voters are more likely to sup-
port a radical right party if they perceive it as ‘normal’ or
‘legitimate’, which at least in part means democratic, ef-
fective and in line with baseline national values’ (2013,
p. 111). Even if their values are not particularly ‘in line’
with these baseline national values, it is strategically wise
to at least keep up appearances and couch them in such
a manner. This also ties in with PRR parties’ increasing
attempts to become more ‘acceptable’ and move closer
to the mainstream: the biological racism of older itera-
tions of such parties is no longer electorally successful
nor even ‘acceptable’ on the fringes of mainstream party
politics in Northern Europe, and as a result, these parties
have also had to streamline their message, learn to sell
it in a more sophisticated way, and adopt both language
and positions that bring them closer to electoral success
(see Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016b).
A second reason for utilising liberal illiberalism is that
it presents Northern European PRR parties with an al-
legedly ‘honourable’ and ‘rational’ way to frame their
Islamophobia. As noted, the appeal to ‘Enlightenment
values’ and the cribbing of the discourse of liberalism
is far more appealing to audiences in these contexts
than outright xenophobia. This shift—from an ethno-
cratic nationalism which centres on a particular ethnic
group to a civic nationalismwhich centres on with those
with ‘shared values’ (Akkerman, 2005)—has been partic-
ularly evident in the Northern European PRR’s embrace
of philosemitism (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1202). A sharp con-
trast to the antisemitism of their forbearers, these par-
ties now see Jews as part of the ‘enlightened West-
ern’ civilisation that must be defended against Islam: in-
deed, Wilders has gone so far as to portray Jerusalem
as the ‘frontier’ for the West against Islam, arguing that
‘if Jerusalem falls into the hands of the Muslims, Athens
and Rome will be next’ (2010). The argument promoted
here is that ‘Western culture is essentially liberal, and lib-
eral values can only be defended against Islam by way of
a cultural war. As Islam is essentially an anti-liberal reli-
gion, in this view, it should be rejectedwholesale’ (Akker-
man, 2005, p. 348). This draws a clear line between
those in favour of liberal values and those opposed to
them—Muslims and ‘the elite’, the latter whom are not
only abetting but are often seen as being in favour of the
Islamisation of Europe: as Wilders argued in 2017, ‘al-
most all politicians of the established parties are promot-
ing Islamization’ and that ‘the establishment, the elite
such as universities, churches, unions, the media, politi-
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cians put our enforced freedoms at stake’ (in PVV Fractie
Noord-Brabant, 2017).
There are important repercussions for this refashion-
ing of illiberal policies in a liberal package. One is that it
contributes to the debasement and ‘emptying’ of liberal
tropes and arguments, which in turn makes it harder for
those who more clearly subscribe to liberal ideology to
defend their position, as it can gradually lose its credi-
bility. In his work on comparative uses of liberalism in
Europe, Freeden (2008, p. 26) shows that ‘the cachet of
liberalism in its thin sense as an ideology concerning lib-
erty hasmade it superficially attractive to thosewho free-
ride on its reputation. Although a thin liberalism is still
an adapted one, misappropriations go beyond that’. The
issue is that this ‘misappropriation’ still affects the repu-
tation and perceived ‘content’ of liberalism, and in doing
so can make it seem ‘thinner’ by the day. As ‘there can
be substantial morphological overlap between the con-
cepts and vocabulary of populism and liberalism’ (Free-
den, 2008, p. 26), PRR parties are in a particularly strong
position to ‘thin out’ liberalism in this regard—a develop-
ment that should concern those who identify as liberals.
The other related core repercussion of liberal il-
liberalism is the above-noted ‘mainstreaming’ of the
PRR in Northern Europe. While this article has already
noted how the PRR’s selective use of liberalism has
brought them closer—at least in rhetoric—to their main-
stream brethren, there is a perhaps another trend at
play here coming from the opposite direction: the fact
that the mainstream is also looking more like the pop-
ulist right. There is a reason that it has become easier for
PRR parties to cherry-pick liberal discourse and policies
from theirmainstream competitors: becausemanymain-
stream parties themselves have reconfigured liberal val-
ues and discourse in similar ways in Western and North-
ern Europe (see Bale, 2003; Mudde, 2013; Muis & Im-
merzeel, 2017; van Spanje, 2010). To only draw on a
few examples—when mainstream parties in France pass
a ban on religious attire; when mandatory integration
classes are introduced in a number of ‘progressive’ coun-
tries; when Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte tells immi-
grants to ‘integrate or leave’; and when putative liberal
and Christian democrats are happy to keep avowed ad-
vocates of illiberalism like Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in their
European People’s Party group in the EU Parliament—
one should perhaps see PRR parties’ adoption of liberal-
ism not as an exception, but as a clear repercussion of
the increasing bankruptcy of the way that many main-
stream actors use liberalism themselves. Indeed, while
Northern European PRR parties may articulate a liberal il-
liberalism, Adamson, Triadafilopoulos and Zolberg (2011)
have argued that a number of ‘non-populist’ European
governments are increasingly putting forward an ‘illib-
eral liberalism’.While it is important to acknowledge that
the order of the modifier and the subject matters greatly
here—as noted earlier, liberal illiberalism indicates that
illiberalism still reigns supreme in this conjunction, while
illiberal liberalism indicates the opposite—the linewhere
one crosses over into the other is becoming less and
less clear.
5. Conclusion: Can Right-Wing Populism Be Liberal?
Having examined cases of PRR parties in Northern Eu-
rope that are characterised by a paradoxical liberal illib-
eralism, we can now return to interrogate the taken-for-
granted assumption in the literature: is populism really
the opposite of liberalism? The answer: perhaps in the-
ory, but not necessarily in practice. These ‘mixed bag’
cases display elements of liberalism as well as illiberal-
ism, and we cannot conveniently ignore the fact that
these parties employ some version of liberal discourse,
if not advocate liberal policies—whether this is disingen-
uous or not.
However, at the same time we cannot seriously call
these parties ‘liberal’, or even ‘liberal populists’. As long
as their core ideology is a form of nativism or civic
nationalism that seeks to exclude rather than include,
then these parties’ illiberalism still remains their core
ideological compass. As Müller notes, in these kinds of
cases, ‘liberal values essentially become nationalist val-
ues: they serve only to exclude. Liberal, ostensibly uni-
versalist rhetoric serves to extract the people from the
people and, de facto, create a kind of self-labelling lib-
eral aristocracy among the people’ (Müller, 2014, p. 489).
While left-wing forms of populism can make a more se-
rious case for incorporating elements of liberalism given
that their conception of ‘the people’ tends to be inclusive
rather than exclusive, the ultimate divide between ‘the
people’ and ‘the elite’ must eventually come into conflict
with the liberal acknowledgement of multiple cleavages
in society.
There are three important lessons here for reflect-
ing on the relationship between liberalism and populism.
The first is that it is somewhat misguided to portray
populism as the direct opposite of liberalism—populists
openly borrow, ape and utilise the language if not the
policies of liberalism, and it is increasingly the case that
it goes the other way as well, where putative liberals
do the same with populism. If they are truly ‘opposites’,
then it would follow that this would be either impossible
or extremely difficult to do, but this is obviously not the
case. The related second point is that ‘ideological purists’
are rare and often relegated to the electoral sidelines,
and as such, it is unsurprising that PRR parties are able
to mix their ideology, policy positions and discourse in
a way that confounds our neat theoretical categories—
in this regard, some populists are more liberal than oth-
ers. Third, the evidence of how these parties reconfigure,
adopt and utilise seemingly paradoxical ideological and
discursive positions lends credence to the position that
populism is less a world-view or ideology (even a thin
one, as in the work of Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017),
and more a discourse (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisia-
nis, Kioupkiolis, & Siomos, 2017) or style (Moffitt, 2016):
as Brubaker (2017, p. 1210) notes, such ‘contradictions
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are not surprising: bound by no stable substantive ide-
ological or programmatic commitments, populism is dis-
tinctively and chronically eclectic, given to instrumental-
izing whatever issues seem exploitable at the moment’.
Today, those issues are most effectively exploited by
wrapping them in a liberal package. Ultimately, Northern
European PRR parties’ liberalism should not be taken at
face value, but rather understood as liberal illiberalism—
an illiberalism that selectively utilises liberal tropes, dis-
course and ideology to put a more ‘acceptable’ face on
otherwise illiberal politics.
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